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The Causes of Emigration from Singapore: How Much is Still Political?

JOEL S. FETZER AND BRANDON ALEXANDER MILLAN

Abstract
Efforts to maintain a robust Singaporean economy have had to confront the serious challenge of substantial brain
drain from the city-state. To address the negative effects of this problem, Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party
(PAP) has adopted a policy of increasing reliance on a foreign labor force. Meanwhile, the PAP appears to ignore
the continued loss of human and intellectual capital. This study examines the main determinants of emigration from
Singapore, specifically the political factors. The analysis is based on two primary data surveys that investigated
what Singaporeans think about emigration: the 2006 Asian Barometer and the 2000–2002 Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Australia. Contrary to some previous empirical literature, data from these surveys indicate that antiPAP and pro-democratic ideas strongly influence the decision of native Singaporeans to leave the island state.
These findings likewise suggest that democratization and an expansion of business and technical education would be
more effective in preserving economic growth than a policy of importing labor in the face of popular xenophobia.
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Singapore ranks as one of the most successful examples of rapid economic development and political stability in
Asia,1 but recent elections have increasingly challenged the hegemony of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). In
the legislative contest of 2011, for example, the dominant party performed worse than it had in any election since
1963, and a cabinet minister even lost his riding.2 Referring to this emboldened political opposition to the PAP,
commentators on Singapore such as Parag Khanna have questioned whether the “island nation [can] stay prosperous
and peaceful as democratic storms begin to blow.”3 Other observers question whether PAP authoritarianism itself is
driving young, highly educated Singaporeans to leave their country of birth. 4 Yap Mui Teng argues, for instance,
that a sense of “helplessness and fear in the face of an overpowering political and power structure that the average
person cannot hope to participate in, penetrate, or even understand” 5 drives emigration.
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Such “moving with one’s feet” clearly harms Singapore’s economy. Philip Lewis and John Tan estimated that the
economic loss to Singapore from emigration in the mid-1990s was $657,306 per graduate;6 Chew calculated the
total annual cost to be approximately $235.45 million for 1988.7 Unfortunately, more recent scholarly estimates do
not appear to be available. But if we adopt Lee Kuan Yew’s 2008 assumption of about “four to five percent of the
top thirty percent” (all of whom would be university graduates) of the residents leaving per year, an inflationadjusted version of the earlier estimate by Lewis and Tan would total more than $52 billion in emigration-caused
losses simply for 2013.7a Among members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean), Singapore
appears to rank highest in emigration after Brunei and Laos,8 and in 2002 the island nation reportedly experienced
the most elevated out-migration rate in the world.9 Every year, upwards of one thousand educated Singaporeans
renounce their native citizenship in favor of that of their new homelands. 10 Since those leaving are young and highly
skilled, the negative fiscal and economic consequences are easily imagined.11 When they do emigrate, educated
Singaporeans most often find residence in the Anglophone countries of Australia, 12 New Zealand,13 Canada, or the
United States, where their proficiency in English is especially marketable. 14 Even emeritus senior minister Goh
Chok Tong admitted that “at his high school reunion, it seemed all his best friends had emigrated to the United
States or Australia.”15 This brain drain may have a crippling effect on Singapore’s economy; in 2009, Lee Kuan
Yew described the problem of brain drain from the island nation as “pretty serious,” and Goh likewise stated at the
same time that if emigration of the best students continued as it had over the previous decade, the country’s talent
pool would be hollowed out.17
The Singaporean government has traditionally viewed emigrants in negative terms; in a 1989 speech, for example,
Goh claimed that “those who leave are a loss to us. . . . Every Singaporean has a place here. We need him [sic] to
keep Singapore going.”17a Officials had tempered their criticism by the early 1990s, however, seeing emigrants
instead as “overseas ambassadors” who are helping to develop Singapore’s external economic links. 18
Unfortunately for the country, however, “those Singaporeans who are most likely to emigrate are precisely the ones
whom Singapore cannot afford to lose.”19 And by 2008 the government was once again criticizing emigration,
describing it as “Singapore’s Achilles Heel” and warning that it threatened to strip the island nation of its critical
“central core” of future political leadership.19a
Of course, this is not the first time Singapore has experienced emigration. During the Great Depression of the 1930s,
the collapse of the local rubber market also provoked large-scale population flight.20 Unlike during the exodus of
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decades past, Singaporeans today do not seem to lack opportunities in the local labor force. In fact, Singaporean
employers are increasingly finding it difficult to maintain a full and qualified staff.21 High emigration coupled with
low fertility rates, especially among the Chinese population, have made Singapore ever more reliant on foreign
labor.22 The PAP government—apparently seeking to preserve a Chinese ethnic majority—has thus developed a
foreign labor policy that maintains existing ethnic ratios and thereby stifles some anti–PRC xenophobia among
Singapore natives.23
Recent election results further suggestthe need for greater political liberalization. Just before the most recent general
election, even the sitting Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong admitted that the PAP had considered ending effective
one-party rule by splitting itself in two. In the end, however, the younger Lee concluded that Singapore was just too
small to field two major-league political parties.23a While the PAP went on to receive 60.1 percent of the popular
vote in 2011, this majority was anything but a victory for the ruling party given its history of manipulating electoral
rules to its own advantage.24 More importantly, the opposition won its first Group Representation Constituency
(GRC; a multi-seat bloc district) and even defeated the sitting foreign minister, George Yeo. According to the Asia
blogger for The Economist, PAP ministers suffered this electoral blow due to voters’ perceptions that the incumbent
government had “lost touch” with the concerns of Singaporeans and allowed a “rapid influx of immigrants.” 25

Empirical Dispute

A great deal of literature written in the early 1990s examined Singapore’s brain drain, but scholarly interest in this
topic has since declined. At the time, Lee Kuan Yew asserted that the idea that Singaporeans were leaving because
of its authoritarian government was “a fiction of Western journalists.” 26 But social scientists in the 1990s regularly
argued that political motivations were acting as strong push factors. According to Gerard Sullivan and Subbiah
Gunasekaran, for instance, 64.6 percent of Singaporean emigrant interviewees in Australia in 1989 reported that the
political system was the worst aspect of living in Singapore: “With regard to the government, the respondents were
critical of the ‘limited freedom,’ ‘high-handed control of daily life,’ ‘government intolerance of opposition,’ and
‘short-sighted and forever-changing government policies’.” In Sullivan and Gunasekaran’s study, Singaporean
migrants to Australia cited a lower level of civil liberties or “individual freedom” in their country of birth as a strong
push factor.27 If most Singaporeans who remained in their homeland in the 1990s were content with the PAP
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political system, these results by Sullivan and Gunasekaran might suggest that opponents of the government were
more likely to move abroad (e.g., to Australia).28 One émigré interviewed in Yap’s small, non-random sample of
Singaporeans in Australia and Canada in 1991 said he would consider returning to Singapore when “the government
shows proof that repression will end.”29 Tan and Chew’s investigation also shows that political alienation
(opposition to the regime) has a large effect on one’s willingness to emigrate.30 In the last decade, however,
empirical studies have challenged the above argument. In his 2005 book chapter, Tan Ern Ser, in particular, found
that politics had little or no political influence on emigration from the island nation.31 In this post-Sullivan and
Gunasekaran, survey-based report, the relationship between Singapore respondents’ level of political alienation and
their self-reported propensity to emigrate was not statistically significant. Based on this empirical result, Tan
concludes that the “extent of opportunity for political influence on the part of the citizens does not have a significant
impact on emigration propensity.”32 This unresolved dispute is thus the one we hope to help resolve in this article: to
what degree is emigration from Singapore still politically motivated?
The literature examining the relationship between politics and emigration is vast and continues to expand as
people’s democratic inclinations challenge authoritarian governments. While a complete review is beyond the scope
of this article, a brief introduction should suffice to provide a theoretical context. Throughout history political
emigrants have sought the refuge of asylum as a way to escape the turmoil of insecurity, persecution, and war.
According to Andrés Solimano, a noted Chilean economist at the United Nations

“Prevailing political regimes⎯democracy or authoritarianism also affect the decision to
emigrate. Individuals prefer countries where individual and economic rights (of speech, of voice,
the right to be elected to office, etc.) are protected (e.g., in a democracy) rather than countries
where these rights are restricted. . . . in non-democracies, the [right of political expression] can
be suppressed or become very costly to exercise, or individuals, who are unsatisfied or discontent
with current political or economic conditions may choose to exit their home country . . .
however, . . . given the cost of migrating, it is likely that professionals, intellectuals, scientists and
entrepreneurs (i.e., human capital) are more likely to emigrate under regimes curtailing
individual and economic rights than unskilled laborers who [are] often less mobile internationally
and face financial constraints to migration.”33
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When confronted with political theorist Albert O. Hirschman’s ultimatum “exit” or “voice,” 34 both political elites
and humble dissidents have often chosen the former. European emigrants in the open-door era,35 German democrats
(the “1848ers”)36 and antifascists,37 Soviet Jews,38 Iranian exiles,39 Tiananmen-era Chinese (the “‘89 Generation”),40
pro-democracy activists in Taiwan,41 pessimistic pre-handover Hong Kongers,42 Libyans fleeing civil war,43 and
survivors of state terrorism in Argentina44 all achieved solace in crossing international borders. 45

Hypotheses
Previous studies of the causes of emigration suggest respondents are more likely to leave if they are better-off than
their fellow citizens or from the upper-class.46 Among ethno-cultural variables, being a religious minority
(especially Christian) makes one more likely to abandon one’s homeland.47 Respondents might also be more
inclined to emigrate permanently if they are relatively well-educated and highly skilled.48 Many Singaporean
students first immigrate to Australia to receive their university education and later convert their student visas into
work permits.49 Although the literature suggests that some Singaporean retirees emigrate to countries with a lower
cost of living,50 students and young interviewees contribute more to brain drain than dp nonstudents and older
generations.51 Men have made up the majority of emigrants,52 perhaps because in traditional societies, they were
more likely to decide on important family matters. Similarly, we would hypothesize that strongly Confucian
respondents will stay home and care for their parents in Singapore instead of seeking new horizons abroad. 53 In a
dominant-party system,54 strong support for the governing PAP will reduce the likelihood of a respondent moving
abroad.55 In contrast, those who expressed a desire to democratize the political system will be more motivated to
emigrate, or choose “exit.”56

Overall, we expect commitments to political openness and civil liberties to be strong

push factors, while upward professional mobility and good economic conditions will be more effective in keeping
those who have already left from returning.57

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses about the causes of emigration from Singapore, we analyze data from the Asian Barometer
Survey: Singapore 2006, and Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, Phase 2. 58
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In the Asian Barometer Survey, national team coordinator Tan Ern Ser (National University of Singapore) used
stratified random sampling and face-to-face interviews between July and November of 2006. The resulting poll
included 1,012 usable questionnaires from citizens of Singapore ages twenty-one to eighty. The sample was
apparently weighted by gender, ethnicity, and age. The question wording that we used for the dependent variable
was “given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country?” 59 Responses varied from
“very willing” to “not willing at all.”60 Our measure of filial piety was a Likert scale for “even if parents’ demands
are unreasonable, children should still do what they ask.” We used similar scales for PAP support (“You can
generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right”) and democracy support (“conflict among
political groups is not a bad thing for our country”).
In the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, Phase 2,60a the Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs conducted in-person interviews from March 2000 to March 2002 with a stratified random
sample of off-shore visaed immigrant principals (n = 3,124) and accompanying spouses (n = 1,094), ages fifteen and
over, who arrived in Australia between September 1999 and August 2000. The interviews resulted in forty-five
usable respondents from Singapore.

***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE***

Results

Table 1 presents the results for the determinants of respondents’ propensity to emigrate. 61 To aid in understanding
the effects of the various assumptions about the causes of emigration, this table describes four different models. All
versions of the regression include the standard economic, ethno-cultural, and demographic variables that are clearly
not caused by people’s attitudes toward emigration. Models 1 and 3, however, also add filial piety, arguably a more
psychological factor that could at least be directly correlated with emigration propensity. 62 The third and fourth
models, meanwhile, both include the political attitudes “PAP Support” and “Democracy Support.”
Contrary to at least the results for the emigration-propensity variable in Tan Ern Ser’s (2005) study, the
fourth column of Table 1 reveals a significant political influence: while possessing pro-democratic attitudes
increases a respondent’s likelihood to emigrate (Model 4: b = .118, p < .05), support for the PAP produces the
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opposite effect (Model 4: b = -.209, p < .05). In more user-friendly terms, a respondent who strongly opposed the
ruling party and fervently endorsed democracy would, all else being equal, be 2.751 points (or 91.7 percent) more
likely to emigrate (on a scale of 1 to 4) than would an interviewee who loyally backed Lee Kuan Yew’s party and
completely rejected democracy. This difference in willingness to leave Singapore is huge and eclipses the
independent effects of a full-range change in even age (27.5 percent less likely if age changed from twenty-one to
eighty) and education (21.3 percent more likely if education changed from no formal education to a postgraduate
degree).
The nonpolitical controls produce a few surprises. In Model 2, loyalty to one’s family just barely fails to
produce statistically significant results at traditional confidence levels (b = .061; p = .066). However, when both
ideological and political variables are introduced in Model 4, filial piety does achieve significance (b = .067, p =
.045), but in the opposite direction (i.e., filial piety boosts pro-emigration views). The data analysis therefore
disconfirms the hypothesis that Confucian concern for their parents is making some Singaporeans hesitate to move
abroad.63
Although among the economic variables, unemployment and income have no effect, being a professional
(Model 2: b = .231, p < .05) or out of the labor force (Model 2: b = .-.217, p < .05) perform as hypothesized.
Perhaps the most unexpected result is that being a woman has no effect in any model. Finally, no ethno-cultural
variable is significant.

***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE***

Actual data from past emigrants now living in Australia also confirm our overall findings about the role of
politics. Of the forty-five Singaporean respondents in the two Australian immigration data sets (see Table 2), thirtyfive said they had had little or no “ability to influence government decisions” in their country of birth. No
respondent stated that he or she had had “a great deal” of political influence in Singapore. A similar story appears
from Singaporean immigrants’ views on “things they disliked most” about their former homeland. Here, the
questionnaires from the forty-five respondents contained seventeen politically related “dislikes” (e.g., “the laws of
the country”).
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Although critics might claim that Singaporeans still living in the Lion City are equally pessimistic about
their political efficacy, survey responses from a contemporaneous poll of Singapore residents tend to allay this
concern. If one looks at the 2002 Singapore subsample of the World Values Survey, 64 91.5 percent of valid
respondents claimed to be “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied” with “the way the people now in national office are
handling the country’s affairs.” In other words, support for the People’s Action Party appears to have been
overwhelming among Singapore residents in that year. In a parallel question from this same survey, 78.1 percent
found that the country was “run for the benefit of the people” instead of being controlled by “a few big interests
looking out for themselves.” This rough comparison of the political attitudes of Singaporean emigrants in Australia
around 2002 with the equivalent opinion of their compatriots still at home suggests therefore that “dissident”
political perspectives are motivating emigration.65

Conclusion

As our regression results show, the political environment in Singapore seems to be the most important factor in
determining emigration from Singapore after one controls for the standard demographics of education and age. In
the dispute between Tan versus Sullivan and Gunasekaran, our data therefore tend to confirm the views of the latter
authors that hostility to Singapore’s authoritarian government and appreciation of Australia’s democratic institutions
represent substantial push and pull factors respectively. Our results furthermore suggest that politics are at least as
important a push factor as they were during the flurry of governmental and scholarly interest in brain drain in the
early 1990s.66
In order to maximize the number of young, highly skilled Singaporean natives who remain in the country
after university, Singapore’s political and educational leaders thus need to make significant changes. To reduce the
number of Singaporean students who move abroad for their higher education and then often remain overseas, the
city-state needs to increase the number of places available to undergraduates, especially those who plan to
concentrate in business or computer science. In addition, this expansion of university capacity could help reduce the
unhealthy level of competition for admission to university, which is another major complaint of many Singaporean
emigrants.67
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But the most important change the PAP should make is to open up the political system. As Sullivan and
Gunasekaran suggested as early as 1994, increased public debate before decisions are made would help people feel
less dissatisfied with the political conditions in Singapore and therefore less likely to leave. Similarly, one of the
policies that Yap suggested was “a more open government” to “erase the credibility gap between the government
and the people.”68 The establishment of true democracy would likely foster support for the government and the
political system, as free and competitive elections often create strong national identity. 69 Such a policy change is not
going to bring back the lost generations of politically alienated emigrants, but it is more apt to attenuate future flight
of highly skilled citizens to democratic, English-speaking countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the
United States. For Singapore’s long-term health, the presence of capable leaders is as necessary to continued
economic growth as “high-quality citizens who can maintain the flow of [democratic] accountability in the
electorate”70 are to an emerging democracy.
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Table 1. Determinants of Propensity to Emigrate from Singapore (2006 Asian Barometer)
Model 1
Hypothesized
Respondent
Sign
Economic
Professional/Manager

+

Unemployed

+

Out of Labor Force

-

Income

+

Model 2
Hypothesized
Respondent
Sign

.224*
[.110]
-.072
[.071]
-.217*
[.094]
.004
[.025]

+

.116
[.118]
.094
[.090]
.012
[.074]
.087
[.111]
.135
[.082]

+

.077*
[.016]
-.013*
[.002]
-.072
[.055]

+

+
+

Model 3
Hypothesized
Respondent
Sign

.231*
[.110]
-.073
[.071]
-.217*
[.093]
.005
[.025]

+

.109
[.118]
.104
[.090]
.001
[.074]
.072
[.112]
.142
[.082]

+

.077*
[.016]
-.013*
[.002]
-.062
[.055]

+

+
+

Model 4
Hypothesized
Respondent
Sign

.183
[.110]
-.087
[.071]
-.230*
[.095]
.001
[.025]

+

.129
[.116]
.116
[.090]
.060
[.075]
.086
[.116]
.133
[.082]

+

.070*
[.016]
-.014*
[.002]
-.050
[.056]

+

+
+

.192
[.110]
-.084
[.071]
-.230*
[.095]
.002
[.025]

Ethno-Cultural
Catholic

+

Protestant

+

Muslim

-

Hindu/Sikh

-

No Religion

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

.119
[.116]
.123
[.090]
.048
[.075]
.072
[.116]
.140
[.082]

Demographic
Education

+

Age

-

Female

-

-

-

-

.071*
[.016]
-.014*
[.002]
-.042
[.055]

Ideological
Filial Piety

-

.061
[.033]

-

.067*
[.034]

-

-.209*
[.044]
.118*
[.033]
2.537*
[.217]
867

Political
PAP Support

-

Democracy Support

+

Constant
N
R2

2.444*
[.157]
906

0.195*
[.182]
903

-.211*
[.044]
.114*
[.033]
2.350*
[.194]
869

.190

.195

.222

+

.227

NOTE: Estimates obtained via ordinary least-squares regression.
All variables are dummies except for Emigration Propensity (range 1-4), Income (range 1-5), Education (range 1-10), Age (range
21-80), Filial Piety (range 1-4), and PAP Support (range 1-4), and Democracy Support (range 2-20).
*p < .05. Standard errors in brackets. All tests are two-tailed.
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TABLE 2: ROLE OF POLITICS AS MOTIVATION FOR EMIGRATION FROM SINGAPORE
(2002 LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF IMMIGRANTS TO AUSTRALIA, PHASE 2)

Emigrants
from
Singapore

Principal
Spouse
TOTAL

Perceived ability to influence one's government decisions
A great extent
Moderate extent Little or no extent
Not stated
0 (0%)
7 (21%)
26 (79%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
2 (17%)
9 (75%)
1 (8%)
0 (0%)
9 (20%)
35 (78%)
1 (2%)

